Power Analysis
– Experiences and Challenges

“An uneducated man can be dominated just with bread and water. The educated man does not want this; he wants citizenship.”

– a poor man in Isla Trinitaria, Ecuador
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In general, poor men and women are subjects in their own lives but in very limited spheres of influence. In describing ill being and the bad life, poor people, and especially women, often express powerlessness vis-à-vis their employers, the state and markets; their inability to get a fair deal; their inability to take a stand against abuse, lying and being cheated; their inability to access market opportunities. Differences in power between men and women, adults and children, and between the poor and the non-poor, affect their opportunities and outcomes in countless interactions. To make a difference, poor people must be able to make their voices heard and be represented in decision-making forums. This implies changes in power relations, attitudes and behaviour. History teaches us that success against poverty has been most rapidly achieved not only when the powerful have concluded that its eradication is in their interest, but when the un-prioritized have sought justice through social action.

Power analysis can help donors understand underlying structural factors impeding poverty reduction as well as incentives and disincentives for pro-poor development. Such analysis may point to i.a. why resources and authority are not transferred to lower levels of government in spite of decentralisation reforms, why women are not allowed to inherit land, and why poor people’s human rights, in particular, tend to be neglected – and what could be done about such expressions of politics of poverty.

This way power analysis, which gravitates to political analysis, may complement other types of analyses referred to in Sida’s policy document, Perspectives of the Poor – social and economic analyses, all of which must take cross cutting concerns into account: such as gender equality, democracy and good governance, respect for human rights, and sustainable development, conflict management and security, social development and security, economic growth, global public goods, and HIV/AIDS.

Political, economic and social analyses must always use the perspectives of the poor and the rights perspective as their starting points: key parts include participation, openness and transparency, accountability, and equality in dignity and rights.

This position paper was compiled with the purpose of reflecting on lessons learned so far. It includes Sida’s experiences as regards process, content, value added, challenges and the road ahead. Experiences were collected through interviews, meetings and a workshop including field as well as headquarters staff. A list of issues to always include in a power analysis is annexed as well as a menu to choose from, depending on con-
text and purpose (Annex 1). Comments and suggestions are more than welcome to the Division for Democratic Governance as we intend to update our best fit as experiences grow (Annex 2). It should be noted, however, that Power and Drivers of Change analysis may raise unrealistic expectations of being able to identify short term action and agents of change which can solve deep seated problems.

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1. Background

A number of donors and creditors have simultaneously developed different approaches to analysing and understanding the political and institutional factors that shape development outcomes – a true turn of the tide. The reasons for why this is becoming an issue now are many fold and include stock taking of progress made relating to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), a shift towards more or less country owned mechanisms for donor assistance like Poverty Reduction Strategies, budget support and sector wide approaches, the DAC harmonisation agenda including the Paris Declaration, all of which call for a deep and sound understanding of key political/economic/social/cultural/religious actors, processes and structures. The centrality of politics to improving aid relevance and effectiveness and to generate better outcomes is now widely appreciated. Power and Drivers of Change analysis have played a role in contributing to this shift in perceptions.

Involved donors are feeling their way on how to proceed. While there is no agreement on what conceptual framework to employ, a common framework may not be desirable since a variety of approaches may generate useful contrasts and insights and prevent analytical hegemony. There are important commonalities, centred on the relationship between political factors, economic conditions, and institutions. The common denominators of the various approaches include an account of history (i.a. state formation), understanding formal and informal institutional and structural factors affecting "lack of political will", a concern that donors themselves may impact in a negative way on incentives for progressive change, thinking more strategically about how change – or retardation – occurs ("how" rather than "what"), and how these changes will affect poor men and women. This reinforces the need for harmonisation of donor approaches to be based on rigorous and honest debate about different perspectives. There are signs that this is already beginning to happen through active dissemination and jointly commissioned studies (Ethiopia, Kenya, Nicaragua, and Tanzania).

The approaches include fixed frameworks to menus of strategic questions that need answering (with a great degree of freedom for country offices to tailor the process and content to the local context). Donors are employing different analytical lenses. Sida’s approach tends to gravitate towards a focus on the links between human rights, democracy and poverty reduction; formal versus informal institutions and agents, and the importance of process; the World Bank to the role of formal public insti-
tutions and informal practices within these; DFID to structural and institutional factors that support or impede poverty reduction (Drivers of Change); the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stability analysis frameworks and German GTZ Governance Questionnaires. International IDEA's work on Democracy Assessment is also of relevance. It would appear that the main challenge does not lay so much in crafting diagnostic instruments (although this may be quite difficult per se) as in operationalising findings in programming and dialogue.

A task team on Power and DOC analysis (co-chaired by Sida together with DFID and Norad, and including the Netherlands, Germany and the World Bank) was asked by Govnet, the OECD/DAC network on Democratic Governance, to take the lead in developing and harmonising these new approaches to analysing underlying interests and power relationships in cooperation countries. Annex 3 provides details of the Task Team, and Annex 4 includes References. The Division of Democratic Governance still wanted to compile Sida’s experiences and challenges for two reasons: there is internal demand for knowledge sharing, and the approaches used by Sida so far tend to differ somewhat from some other actors (mainly on emphasis on process as a goal in itself and the focus on formal as well as informal institutions and change agents).

So far, Sida has carried out power analyses on Ethiopia, Kenya, Bangladesh, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso – all of them as integral parts of the country strategy processes, except for Bangladesh which was carried out as part of a program appraisal. In October 2003, Sida organized an internal workshop to take stock of our experiences so far and share what we have learnt. Analyses to be concluded include Mozambique (initially limited to the Niassa province, a second phase will include the national level) Sri Lanka and Uganda; Honduras is in the pipeline. In Bolivia, a process was initiated (focus groups discussed terms of references) but due to political developments and potential collaboration with other donors/creditors, other end products than a Sida-specific analysis may be the outcome of the process. In most cases the practical purpose has been a combination of a need to increase our knowledge in conjunction with a country strategy process and to contribute to changes in the country concerned through more relevant programs and dialogue.

Sida initiated power analysis as a consequence of several factors: recommendations contained in an internal document on lessons learned regarding support to political institutions, conclusions drawn during a Sida-sponsored conference on Democracy, Power and Partnership, concrete need for thorough analysis in some of the Sida country strategy processes, and, in particular, the political re-launching of poverty as a multidimensional concept; highlighting the lack of power, security and opportunities/resources as fundamental causes of poverty. Thorough analysis and understanding of agents for or against pro-poor change, political will and possibilities, responsibilities, resources, formal and informal power structures and power relations are thus essential to multi-dimensional analyses of the politics of poverty reduction.
2. Value Added and Practical Impact

What difference will such analysis make? In our experience power analysis may serve to:

• make development cooperation more strategic and realistic with more realistic time frames and indicators for judging progress;
• contribute to improving aid effectiveness and relevance by highlighting the risks of alternative strategies and investments, and demonstrating how political considerations and a more incremental approach can improve implementation;
• make donor agencies more prone to risk analysis, risk management and alternative approaches: in place of traditional interventions (which tend to be technical in approach) that seek to by-pass elites or directly challenge elite ‘capture’, it suggests that there may be more room for manoeuvre and scope for negotiation around pro-poor interests and outcomes than is often supposed.
• foster shared understanding on why poverty prevails and stimulate thinking about processes of change, i.e. what could be done about informal and formal power relations, structures, and actors/incentives contributing to this state of affairs;
• contribute to intra and inter donor dialogue about differences in perspectives
• challenge donor assumptions about conditions for pro-poor reform;
• improve dialogue in country, i.e. by contracting local scholars and organising seminars which may serve to identify new issues as well as partners

It should also be mentioned that ‘power’ – although it is a contested concept – seemed to bridge internal debates between our economists, anthropologists and political scientists.

The operational impact of Sida’s analysis range from planning, programming, risks and opportunities, dialogue to harmonisation:

Planning: All studies have contributed to improving the quality of engagement through a deeper understanding of informal and formal political, economic, social and cultural dynamics including potential incentives for change and allies – be it at program level or country strategy level. In Tanzania, to mention one example, power has shifted away from government to donors that insist on setting the terms for the coun-
try’s development and abandon project and program aid. The Government of Tanzania may own the development process, but its direction is set by the external agencies. It also shows the persistence of informal relations of power, and argues that the problem in Tanzania is not that central authorities are too strong, but rather the opposite – that they are too weak.

Workshop validation of recommendations made in studies could further improve their utility as planning tools (Kenya, Uganda) and input into a common understanding of the political environment.

**Programming:** In Kenya (first round), the study confirmed that programmes in general were in line with what was needed to promote more equal power relations, the voices of poor men and women and responsiveness to their claims by the authorities. A need for further work, however, was noted in order to promote change not only within the state apparatus in each sector (as regards capacity, awareness raising, access to information, and human rights based approaches) but also in civil society – state relations which needed to move into a more constructive mode of interaction.

The Burkina Faso and Mali studies had visible impact on choices within democratic governance. In other cases the analysis provided clear arguments against support to specific programs; in Bangladesh, the analysis was carried out as part of an appraisal of a district level programme on local governance and concluded that high risks of elite capture would undermine the programme. Sida accordingly decided not to fund the programme. In Ethiopia (first round), the study pointed out that issues such as local politics/governance and ethnicity deserved more attention, but as agreements were ongoing, no programming impact would occur until new agreements were entered into. The need for more support to democratic governance issues and actors such as social movements and interest groups within civil society was also identified through Sida’s analysis (Ethiopia). In the Tanzania case, implications of provision of budget support on power were included, in particular as regards the related need for greater support for non-governmental organizations. Thus, domestic accountability systems as well as dialogue addressing such issues will become more crucial in development cooperation.

**Risks and Opportunities Analysis:** In Burkina Faso, Mali and Mozambique the processes highlighted risks related to ongoing decentralisation reforms; without sufficient checks and balances at the local level, these could very well contribute to a deepening of existing inequalities in access to political power in the local arenas, feeding into dormant conflicts, or the re-emergence of one party systems. This pointed to the need for thorough preparation of elected representatives, local administration as well as local civil society before delegating powers to the local level. In Ethiopia (first round) the analysis noted the importance of the principle of “do no harm”; i.a. by avoiding putting all eggs in one basket. In Kenya (both rounds) the importance of counteracting abuse of power as well as empowering people to claim their rights were pinpointed.

Power analysis may also serve to identify progressive processes of change, agents of change, and windows of opportunity, not least in the sense of questioning assumptions and myths amongst local actors as well as donor agency staff. In one case a power analysis showed that women of a particular district, that was up to then referred to as remote, very traditional and conservative, no longer accepted the local tradition of male dominance in the public arena. The women participated in alphabetization classes and spoke out in public. Another example concerns an
ethnic group which used to be perceived, by themselves and most other
groups, as discriminated against, in particular as regards access to edu-
cation. In reality, they were quite successful traders and were perceived
by other ethnic groups as talented in doing business.

Dialogue: In our experience, power analysis may serve as a “reality
check” by feeding local/provincial realities into policy dialogue within
donors groups and with the government or other actors at national level.
Dialogue opportunities pertaining to national budgets, poverty strat-
egies, public sector reforms, public financial management and decentrali-
sation/de-concentration reforms could thus become more grounded in
realities.

Moreover, findings and series of workshops contributed to a more en-
lightened Swedish dialogue with local partners in Kenya (first and sec-
ond round), but it also facilitated constructive dialogue between state
representatives and social movements and interest groups in Kenya. In
Bolivia, dialogue was used in an even more instrumental manner: terms
of references of the power analysis to be were drafted based on discus-
sions in different focus groups (civil society, media, government repre-
sentatives, women from different segments of society etc.). As in Kenya,
this arrangement contributed to and generated debate within and be-
tween these groups. Improved dialogue was stated as one of two main
objectives of the Uganda case. In Tanzania, there is now an increasingly
shared position among both Tanzanians and development partners that
power matters in development efforts, and thus a need to understand
how it matters: how power is structured, exercised, and controlled; the
role that power plays in setting national agendas; formulating and imple-
menting policy as well as the legacy it leaves among citizens.

Harmonisation was facilitated due to a common understanding of po-
litical economy related challenges in Kenya (second one), Ethiopia (first
and second rounds), Tanzania, and possibly also in Mozambique. In
Kenya, donors agreed that democratic governance improvements are key
to economic development; emphasising the importance of embedding
principles like accountability, openness and transparency, rule of law and
access to justice, empowerment of poor people to claim their human
rights, meritocracy etc. within the elite as well as the state apparatus.
Meetings to discuss findings and implications have been very rewarding
and have contributed to a Joint Assistance Strategy and joint sector spe-
cific studies of governance, justice and health. In Tanzania, the emer-
gence of new aid modalities has brought a greater emphasis on dialogue
on poverty reduction strategies, sector policies, and core reform imple-
mentation. This shift entails a necessity to monitor power relations in
their broader societal context and conduct a dialogue based on evidence
based power monitoring to complement traditional political/governance
reporting for follow up on democratic governance. In Bolivia, a joint
study by Sida and at least one other donor/creditor may turn into reality,
a decision is pending15. In Mozambique, the Sida initiated power analysis
will be linked to a similar analysis coordinated by DFID.

Finally, a word of caution: harmonisation could risk a watering down
of agendas, in particular in situations where foreign policy priorities or
policy priorities differ between donors/creditors. It would thus appear
advisable to work with like-minded donors when it comes to potentially
sensitive initiatives like power analyses.
3. The Road Ahead

3.1 Remaining Challenges – Process and Content

The degree and types of participatory processes will vary considerably depending on the primary objective of the study and the country’s degree of authoritarianism/semi-authoritarianism/democracy. It is also important to strike a balance between agencies’ legitimate need for information to improve their understanding and agencies’ aim to support transformational processes within cooperation countries.

The degree to which governments and other key actors such as parliamentary committees/staff, civil society representatives, political parties, academia, media, ombudsmen and business interests should be involved depends on purpose and intended audience. Separate focus group meetings may be needed for groups that may otherwise not be heard – indigenous groups (in particular women), young men and women, rural men and women.

According to our experiences thus far there are synergies to be made by facilitating discussions and meetings between groups that normally do not interact around issues of power. Moreover, donor agencies could invite local actors on a regular basis to scrutinize power implications of donor’s decisions and actions. This has been tried in one case, as an integral part of drafting a future country strategy, and was assessed as so rewarding that a second meeting is planned in order for workshop participants to get feedback on how their remarks were used.

In general, the value of promoting public discussion and debate in partner countries has not been at the forefront of design considerations, but this deserves further attention in the future. Public discussion and validation of the issues addressed by the Power and DOC analysis is easier in some countries than in others, depending on their political sensitivity and opportunities for public dialogue. Research institutes, in particular those focusing on applied/action based research, and the media may have a role to play in this regard.

Practice on disseminating findings varies. The most common practice is to make studies available to select contacts without systematic distribution, although the first round study of Ethiopia has been widely disseminated to government, universities, libraries, diasporas, civil society, and donors. There are major opportunities for constructive dialogue and joint learning, both among donors, and between donors and development partners through more active dissemination and engagement.
Parallel support to local knowledge production, formulation of pluralist opinions and agenda setting (through free and independent academic research – in particular political economy, political anthropology, sociology, political science, and possibly law; think tanks; free and independent media; cultural workers etc.) is paramount for several reasons, the main one being inherent dangers of analytical hegemony when donors and creditors with immense resources make their own analyses, diagnoses and prescriptions, particularly the power to define problems and solutions, thus (un)intentionally marginalizing and sometimes even undermining local institutions’ capacity and space.

Designing diagnostic tools tends to be somewhat easier than using and acting upon the information that comes out of the diagnosis. There is a tendency that studies are better at explaining why traditional donor interventions (to reform the public service, or tackle corruption) have not worked very well, than they are at offering concrete alternatives. The first step to address this challenge is to specifically ask for operational recommendations in terms of references. Even better is to elaborate, discuss and validate what to do in (a series of) workshops with focus groups.

Finally, as regards process, it remains to create clearer incentives for staff to plan and implement power analysis. A critical mass of qualified staff/management is critical. It is hoped that this compilation of value added and lessons learned may contribute to making the use of power analysis even more attractive.

When it comes to content, the gender dimension of our analyses remains to be developed. There is a wide agreement that poverty alleviation most likely would be more effective had poor women more power over resources and their own body. Gender power is therefore important to consider in a power assessment intended to inform interventions for poverty alleviation. The main sources of poor women’s lack of power are generated in what usually is defined as the private sphere, within the realm of family life. Sometimes women’s subordinate position is supported by legal provisions but often it is understood as culturally or religiously dictated. Power is embedded in cultural and social discourses which, for example, define the meanings of concepts as “head of household”. Accordingly, it is important to address “hidden” dimensions of power. By unveiling such dimensions we would increase our understanding of the role of i.a. the institution of family and marriage arrangements – which are core arenas where inequalities and gender hierarchies are constructed and embedded. Country Gender Profiles could benefit from a gender power assessment, and the other way, power analyses could benefit from considering the wider position of women.

Links to HIV/AIDS also remain to be developed. There is no doubt that such links exist:

“As HIV/AIDS has spread across the globe, we have learned that it is a disease caused by people’s behaviour, not by their identity…. However, people make their decisions about how to behave in a larger social and political context that presents constraints and opportunities affecting those decisions. We should not be surprised, then, to see that the disease follows pathways of power and powerlessness often defined by economic wealth, gender and race.”

To understand the deep impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, it is necessary to adopt a perspective that spans at least 40–50 years ahead, and the full wavelength of the epidemic may be as long as 120 years.
This falls well outside any normal time horizons, and makes it very difficult to forecast and imagine long term effects on society and livelihoods including possible impacts on power structures and institutions.

It would appear that there is a need to make links to the importance of growth for poverty reduction and democratic governance, and the need to give more attention to the role of the state, including the importance of state effectiveness as well as accountability and capacity to fulfil human rights obligations.

Clearer links to human rights based approaches to development and conflict analysis remain to be developed. Power analysis may contribute to a deeper understanding of why poor men and women are discriminated against and why national and local authorities do not respond to their claims and what donors could do about it. Power analysis may identify needs for cross community meetings and dialogue as critical to overcome cleavages and promote change, while conflict analysis may be better at explaining why such meetings do not materialize. All of these approaches could push the arguments of the others a bit further.

3.2 Remaining Challenges – Donor Harmonisation

Tensions are emerging between corporate objectives and the implications of Power and DOC analysis, which may not be well aligned with donor incentives to demonstrate short term impact, respond to their own taxpayers and lobby groups and to spend the allocated aid resources for two main reasons: (i) political economy analysis suggests the need to focus on local political processes and actors (including donors) and to expect longer timescales for fundamental change to take place; and (ii) the studies highlight the importance of informal institutions (such as kinship and patronage, which are difficult for outsiders to understand or influence) in shaping organisational behaviour and policy outcomes.

In addition, Power and DOC analysis often generate findings that challenge the implications of increased ownership and the speed with which the alignment and harmonisation drive is implemented, and to question the rationale for increased aid investments and the utilisation of new aid instruments. This may be regarded as inconvenient in some quarters. But these concerns should not invalidate the value of Power and DOC as they may be used to inform the aid effectiveness agenda, in particular to mitigate the risks involved.

There is an expectation that Power and DOC analysis might provide a firmer footing for the harmonisation agenda in terms of providing common ground for joint donor initiatives. Enhanced collective donor understanding may lead to better design of pro-poor aid interventions and improve long term effectiveness. This is particularly important where donors are moving towards Joint Assistance Strategies. But while there is a high level of shared understanding about the problems, there is significant variation among donors in understanding of, and approaches to, development and the best means to address them.

A starting point – which could bring together donors and creditors concerned with public financial management, and donors who emphasise civil society as the source of demand for change – might be a discussion of state-society dynamics around tax and public expenditure issues. Such a focus would fit neatly into the OECD/DAC/Govnet Programme of Work 2007–2008 which is likely to include politics of taxation. Such a focus on State effectiveness would make continued links between Govnet and Power and Drivers of Change work imperative, even after the graduation of Power and Drivers of Change development, come the end of the
network’s current two year work programme in December 2006.

Ideally, a coordinated approach to political economy analysis should be orchestrated to feed systematically into the deliberations on joint assistance programmes and strategies. However, this does not necessarily imply joint Power and DOC studies, but rather that the donors each undertake studies based on their particular needs, interests and comparative advantage, and that experiences are shared and discussed. This would strengthen the quality of joint strategies and programmes, lower the risks, and lead to greater aid effectiveness.

3.3 Next Steps
Future work should include:

- Dissemination of this document to relevant Sida staff (including at the yearly Democratic Governance Retreat), other donors/creditors, and other interested actors
- Support to Sida field offices wanting to initiate power analysis, make recurrent analyses, or work on similar instruments with groups of donors/creditors
- Continued development of instruments in collaboration with Sida Division of Peace and Security in Development Cooperation, Gender Advisors, and Poverty Advisors.
- Internal pilot work to bridge and possibly merge political, economic and social analyses as referred to in Perspectives of the Poor with the aim to further deepen and enlighten poverty analyses at country level
- Develop clearer links to human rights based approaches to development and conflict analysis
- Participation in new joint (like-minded) donor efforts in the field
- Participation in an informal network which may emerge out of the Govnet Task Team after graduation in December 2006. This network is likely to include donors doing various types of political economy analyses, and should dock into Govnet at appropriate meetings to share updates and invite new members
- Usage of the Govnet Guidance Note on Power and DOC as a complement to this position paper
- Continued collection of lessons learned, best fit, and documented operational innovations resulting from power analysis i.e. through a second workshop with the Uppsala University Collegium for Development Studies in 2007 or 2008.
- Update of the position paper in 2008
The aim of Sida’s power analysis so far has been twofold – a combination of a need to increase our knowledge and thus to make our programs more relevant, improve dialogue and possibly contribute to transformative processes in the country concerned.

What we want to achieve is to try another way of painting the political landscape, with more shades and nuances – including formal and informal power relations and structures, as well as another way of understanding how these factors affect and are affected by development cooperation. The analysis of actors, interest groups and structures will ideally show where real power in a society lies, how power is distributed and possible conflicts of interests. It may also point to what kind of power is being exercised and how, as well as how this is understood or perceived, by whom and for what purposes and what consequences this have. It is hoped that allies/agents/incentives for change may be identified as well as operational recommendations on what to do.

The truth that politics involve harshly competing interests, bitter power struggles, and fundamentally conflicting values tends to be downplayed until it asserts itself, unwanted, at some later stage in the strategy or programming process. When analysing i.a. political power dimensions of poverty, it is thus vital to assess whether the political system is primarily characterised by political power with foundations in strong leadership rather than in stable political institutions, if political power is generated and transferred through informal agreements rather than through elections, and if diversity among organisations in the civil society is only permitted as long as they do not demand political pluralism. Being attentive about such semi-authoritarian symptoms of the nature of power may counterbalance mechanic assumptions about how politics of poverty is shaped, and the tendency to draw attention to actors rather than structures and underlying conditions in a society.

Some of the main areas of concern of a power analysis include analysis of actors, interest groups and structures with the purpose to show which are dominant, i.e. where the real power in society lies, and their scope and incentives for pro-poor reforms. The chain of voice, representation and influence tends to be cut by either discrimination (prejudice/lack of availability, access, acceptability or quality) or elite capture/corruption or both.
Some other key areas of understanding where questions could be asked are summarised below. Not all areas need to be tackled simultaneously, but all should be considered at some point.

- **Basic country analysis** including social, political, economic and institutional factors affecting the dynamics and possibilities for pro-poor change, including both formal and informal actors, structures and institutions of power in society, underlying history, geopolitics, natural resources, state formation, demography, socio-economic effects/impact of HIV/AIDS (i.e. of drastically increased excess adult mortality, industrialisation etc). This part could very well be done in cooperation with other donor agencies. If such analysis or research already exists there is no need for duplication.

- **Medium-term dynamics** of change including incentives and capacities of pro-poor agents for change operating within particular institutional domains (i.e. policy processes) or informal processes.

- **Role of external forces** including donor actions, aid modalities and influencing strategies on these processes.

- **Link between change and poverty reduction** including how expected changes will affect poverty, on what time-scale, and the implications, including the effects of HIV/AIDS which are very long term (inter generational) and both cause and worsen poverty.

- **Operational implications** including how to translate understanding of underlying interests and power relationships into strategies and actions in the Country Assistance Plan.

- **How we work** including organisational incentives for staff to acquire and retain a deeper knowledge of country context.

The following issues have so far proved quite useful in pinpointing political/economic/social/cultural actors, processes and structures and their relation to pro-poor change. Bear in mind that the precise actors, processes and structures are country specific – this is why we hesitate to opt for a fixed framework beyond some core issues.

**Core issues to always include:**

- How is formal and informal power distributed in society? (between central/local level, urban/rural, migrants/locals, elite groups/people in general, majorities/minorities/indigenous groups, modern/traditional institutions, secular institutions or organisations/religious ones, private/public, classes/races/ethnicities/gender/ages/within families)

- How is formal and informal power distributed in society according to gender? (at central/local level, urban/rural level, migrants/locals, elite groups/people in general, majorities/minorities/indigenous groups, modern/traditional institutions, secular institutions or organisations/religious ones, private/public, classes/races/ethnicities/ages/within families)

- Assess how power relations are distributed in the private sphere, bearing in mind that unequal position in the family generates inequalities in the public spheres.

- What kind of formal and informal power is being exercised, how is it exercised and how is this understood or perceived, and by whom?

- What types of hidden dimensions of power exist, especially but not only, relating to gender?
– How do belief systems and cultural practices legitimate and reinforce material power structures?
– Do stigma and discrimination related to HIV/AIDS reinforce powerlessness of the poor and vulnerable?
– Is the state apparatus characterized by too much/too little constructive power (power to) or controlling power (power over)?
– Which are the major conflicts of interests related to power/powerlessness, politics of poverty and democratization processes? In what arenas are such conflicts acted out (e.g. in the streets, the judiciary, parliament, media, labour-market relations, within families through i.a. violence against women and children)?
– Which groups tend to be un-prioritized? Widows, disabled people, orphans, people affected by HIV/AIDS, people in conflict with the law, people with different sexual orientations, indigenous peoples?

Beyond the very general issues listed above, it is crucial to link poverty, understood as powerlessness, to democratic governance, including human rights, along three important dimensions:

• The ability of the poor and their advocates to articulate their concerns (information, knowledge and organisational capacity at the grassroots level);
• The institutional channels and arenas for effectively voicing these concerns (elections, hearings, litigation, participatory policy-making processes, lobbying, media).
• The legal basis of poverty reduction, i.e. to what extent are the human rights of the poor to be non-poor embedded in legal instruments?

**Articulation and Voice.** First of all, power entails that poor groups have a voice to raise their concerns. Within this category we should always ask how the concerns of the poor are articulated and expressed, and how their articulation can be made more effective. It should be noted, however, that the low organisational level of women makes it difficult to see how much voice women have. In many cases it is improper for women to openly express other views than those of the head of the household. One should not too readily assume that participation can overcome deeply embedded material and cultural practices that legitimate and maintain inequalities; giving voice to the voiceless will not automatically challenge established power structures, but it is an important first step.

Questions to address in future power analysis could include:

How do prevailing power relations and structures affect poor men and women’s chances of participating in, being represented and influencing decision-making and resolution of conflicts of interests, which may affect their efforts to improve the quality of their lives – at national, regional, local levels as well as within families? To what extent do they enjoy and have the capacity to use freedom of expression and the right to organize?

What are the central agents and organisations providing a voice to the poor? Do these agents engage in representative decision-making bodies? Do they focus on comprehensive issues, interests and agendas or do they limit themselves to single issues?

How can networks and federations of poor people’s organizations (women and men) be heard and represented in decision-making that affects their lives at the family, local, and national levels?
Power distribution within organisations could be assessed by listening to women and men separately to identify different experiences, making a discourse analysis of interviews and documents, and, if applicable, confront the various actors and ask them to articulate comments.

What are the most important arenas for articulating the interests and claims of the poor, in rural as well as urban areas?

How may effective institutional channels be established for poor men, women, boys and girls to voice their concerns and to create opportunities for broader participation?

How can empowerment and organisational capacity among the poor be increased through community-based organisations and NGOs?

What are the incentives for groups to organise and promote their particular interests? To what extent do AIDS-activist groups exist?

What are the incentives for agents of state power to engage with organised groups in the society? How do they do it?

What are the incentives/disincentives within the private sector to push for pro-poor change?

Does academia have the capacities and possibilities of engaging in (constructive) critique?

How do men and women in various contexts, as individuals or groups, position themselves in the production and reproduction of power relations and manoeuvre to either preserve or alter power-based relations on their own terms?

How do production, allocation and usage of resources (time, land, tenure, financial resources, facilities, information, training, health care etc.) affect in particular poor men and women and their access to power? Are there barriers to poor women’s equal participation in this regard?

In de facto one-party states – are there links between the party and the state apparatus, i.a. through party cells at each level? How does this affect scope for existing or emerging opposition groups?

Are public resources used by the one-party state/dominant party to promote its own narrow interests?

How is power exercised at community/village level? How do traditional leaders and customary law interact with popularly elected leaders, their staff and formal law?

Is civil society characterized by a predominance of groups with a narrow social base, a mode of internal decision-making based on hierarchy rather than membership, and ad hoc forms of engagement with the state?

To what extent are urban-based civil society organisations connected to community based organisations in rural areas?

Do poor men and women have access to independent information, in particular through radio broadcasts or TV? Information Communication Technology? Are cultural workers allowed to freely express themselves? Are their pieces of work distributed and accessible? Are all groups allowed to take part in cultural life?

**Responsiveness.** Secondly, for voices (of the poor) to be heard, there must be mechanisms in place in a given country/locality for making agencies at various levels responsive to the voice of the poor. Key questions in terms of enhancing the responsiveness to the concerns of the poor and thus enhance their power could include:

Are there actors, processes, and initiatives for the strengthening of poor people’s participation and influence in decision-making as well as access to social services and productive resources?

What structures and institutions shape capacity and incentives for actors and how?
How can we add to the weight of the poor relative to other interest groups?

Who defines and prioritises what needs and human rights should be catered to at the local, provincial and national level and how are such decisions made? It is also of utmost importance to analyse to what extent poor men’s and women’s voices were heard, their interests represented, and how much influence they got in decision-making processes?

Are the political culture and professional norms of the decision-makers receptive in this regard and how can they be made more sensitive?

How can the ability of the decision-makers to comprehend poverty concerns and to plan and implement policy in response be strengthened?

How can development policies increase poor men and women’s access to political, economic and social opportunities and resources and their freedom of choice and action?

How can poor women’s and men’s own efforts and organizations be supported?

Do poor women and men, girls and boys have the capacity and access to arenas (state, civil society, market) at national, regional and local levels where they can voice their concerns, where the state, civil society, or the market may be responsive to their demands, and where these can be held accountable by poor men, women, boys and girls – directly or through elected representatives?

How does the composition and actions of security forces affect power relations?

How do relations between the social base and the internal composition of the state shape state capacity and legitimacy?

Is there a web of (trans-national) organized crime encompassing the country/region and how does this web interact with government, business and civil society?

How do resource extraction, control, and legitimacy affect power structures and relations?

Do illicit and illegitimate forms of allocation occur? How do these affect incentives/disincentives for pro-poor development?

Accountability. Finally, we need to identify and promote mechanisms for holding agents accountable for their decisions, priorities, policies and faults of omission as they bear on poverty. Such mechanisms should be sustainable and capable of being institutionalised. Issues that could be of relevance include:

They may relate predominantly to transparency, such as systematic reporting on the poverty profile of public spending; to answerability, by instituting consultation procedures giving all affected parties a right to be heard; or to controllability, by introducing court-like structures of sanctioning.

Are there effective systems and sanctions against abuse of power and violation of human rights?

Is there a more or less visible shadow government guiding policies, decisions and resource allocation?

What are the sources of the state’s legitimacy?

Formal mandates (horizontal and vertical) and, in particular, de facto power relations between different branches of government at national as well as local levels, including these institutions’ relations with other layers of society: business communities, social movements and interest groups, traditional society, and donors and creditors (see below).

Are local partners more accountable to donors/local financiers than to citizens/members/clients?
The role of donors and creditors should also be included in a power analysis.

To what degree is government financially (and politically) dependent on donors and creditors for sustaining even the most basic functions?

What implications do donors’ actions and choice of aid instruments have for agency and accountability?

What is the likely impact of external interventions on internal incentives and the scope for progressive change?

What is the relative effectiveness of different aid modalities and courses of action?
Annex 2
– Lessons Learned

Although our experience to date is limited, there are still some lessons learned. It should be emphasized that this has very much been a learning-by-doing process, in some cases politically sensitive.

a. Process and method

*Power Analysis – Analysis of Poverty.* Power analysis could be seen as an attempt to contribute to a merging of the perspectives of the poor with the rights perspective (which includes not only human rights but also democracy, gender equality and a particular emphasis on the rights of the child) as poverty includes lack of access to political, social, economic and cultural power. Key aspects include capacity amongst poor men and women to *voice* their concerns, corresponding *responsiveness* by government, civil society and the market to the voice of the poor, and arenas where such actors may be held *accountable* to poor people.

The *primary purpose* should be set out in the terms of reference, whether it is to deepen knowledge, facilitate dialogue, foster influence, or feed into policy development and programming. Focus is necessary in order to get a report/process that is likely to become useful. Limit the range of issues to what is manageable given consultants’ time constraints.¹⁹

Operational recommendations should always be included – and be validated through workshops or the like.

*Local expertise* – As a matter of principle we think that studies about deep rooted conditions, structures and actors in a particular country should be done by local experts and researchers, to the largest extent possible depending on sensitivity. It is a matter of creating local arenas for political debate and facilitation of local production of analysis and understanding. The same is valid for organising seminars and workshops as part of the study with relevant knowledgeable local people. In some cases, however, it is advisable to hire external experts (with exceptional insights) in particular in politically sensitive situations. Minor scale studies could also be drafted by staff.

*The result of the study is the process as much as the report.* In Mozambique time constraints did not allow for focus group discussions of terms of references, reference groups, or peer group consultations, something that the Embassy in hindsight would have wanted to include, not least, to facilitate dissemination and future deliberations with local partners.

Experiences from Kenya suggest that conducting power analysis before drafting a country strategy process can be very useful. Not only for
the report as such, but for the sake of debate within the Embassy and in seminars etc. with external scholars during the preparation of the country strategy.

Politics and political institutions in developing countries tend to be ‘un-institutionalised’ and even more in flux than in most OECD countries. There are thus questions about how far and for how long a period of time a single document, however well produced, will be valid. For this very reason analysis could thus be done in sequences (series of seminars, series of minor reports) over a longer period of time rather than as a one-off activity.

Reinventing of the wheel – There are no reasons why donors have to invent the wheel individually. Analysis could be done jointly (Ethiopia, Kenya) or through division of labour, or to fill gaps in existing analysis. This lesson learned may be taken care of through the harmonisation work by DAC/Govnet.

There is also scope for commissioning more specialised studies to follow up the large all-encompassing country level analysis as a means of adding value and avoiding duplication (cf. Bangladesh which contributed to a strategic analysis of the Local Governance and Production programme and Mozambique which initially will cover one province only – Niassa – a second phase will include the national level). Politics of corruption or state-society dynamics around taxation and public expenditure issues would appear interesting areas.

Do no harm – This is a common concept of conflict analysis which could be very useful in general political analysis as well – meaning that we should make sure that our interventions do not have a negative impact on the conflict situation and end up making the situation worse for our partners.20 Local context should determine process, methods and purpose, in particular in situations where a government feels threatened by mounting opposition or when violent conflict is a growing threat. It is important that we as donors think about why we are interested in politics. It is natural for donors to be interested — we are participants. But we should also or perhaps primarily, be reflecting on what our routine and strategic actions do in the political arena — what effects do they have for political relations, institutions, processes and above all agency. Given the many risks involved, prudence would seem to be good counsel.

There is a lot to be gained from working together with Sida’s advisors on peace and security, either by doing joint analysis or by inspiring each other. Sida’s advisors on peace and security have suggested that conflict analysis should, if possible, be based on power analysis or, when appropriate, power analysis should integrate a conflict perspective (see below).

Linkages between Power analysis – Conflict analysis21. Conflict analyses are mainly done when institutions in society cannot or will not be able to handle existing violent conflicts of interests with peaceful means while a power analysis is done when this ability with some degree of efficiency (still) exists in society. The socio-political situation in partner countries is often characterised by potential internal outbreaks of open violent conflicts. Experience has shown that a distinction for analytical purposes between a situation with open violent conflict and potential violent conflict gives only limited added value. The key is to focus on internal embedded contracting interests within a country and how these are expressed and handled by society. Based on this experience, it is quite clear that “conflict analysis” and “power analysis” are closely related. As democratisation challenges existing power structures, a thorough analysis of power structures and relations, formal as well as actual, is a useful basis for a
conflict analysis/analysis. The experiences from the Kenya power analysis suggest, however, that even though the relation between power analysis and conflict analysis is close, it could also be too complex to deal with the two in the same study. This means that conflict perspectives could very well be mainstreamed into power analysis, but a complete conflict analysis is often too complex and needs to be done separately.

*Democratisation* in itself is often a *conflict producing process*, at least in the short term, as it aims to change the distribution of power between groups in society. This constitutes one of the clear bridges between conflicts and democratisation in development cooperation, including the concept of structural conflict interventions. A study commissioned by Sida, argues that in a democratisation process “… the legitimacy and capacity of the state itself and the ability of the current democratisation process to overcome and outlast pre-democratic structures of power” is of key importance. The authors point to the need for analysis of the empirical context of the democratic transition, i.e. the structures of power.

**Commitment of senior management** – this is really a prerequisite in order to initiate, plan and complete such complex exercises as political analysis. Staff need internal incentives to carry out the work. Explicit support from senior management may be one such incentive.

**Copy-right and personal security** may become an issue. Names of authors of the reports may need to be withheld from official versions before dissemination. This issue should be dealt with before signing contracts with consultants.

**Methods** could include anything from state of the art reports based on previous studies/research to large number of interviews or series of focus group discussions – or all.

**b. Content**

*The concept of “power”* is fundamentally contested, i.e. people mean a range of different things when they use the term. We could have commissioned alternative studies of the same country at the same moment from different people, and end up with very different products. A concept like “change” could most probably be discussed in the same way.

‘Liberals’ (according to the classic meaning of the term) view institutional/state power primarily as a (potential) threat to the well-being of members/citizens, and define good governance primarily in terms of egal, constitutional and other arrangements that protect against this threat, by limiting institutional/state power. They are worried about the controlling use of power, and warm to terms like accountability, democracy and participation. By contrast, ‘collectivists’ see the state (and other authoritative organisations) primarily as a means of aggregating power and resources that may be used for the collective good. They view the weakness of government – manifested as disorder, vulnerability to external threat, or failure to provide public services – as the prime potential problem. ‘Collectivists’ therefore tend to interpret good governance in terms of arrangements that promote the coherence and effectiveness of the state and other organisations. They warm to terms like authority, order, and capability. They emphasise the need for more state power, of the constructive kind.

Power may be seen as a *capacity* (who prevails in decision-making, that is, who is the winner) or in other words – power over, the conflict aspects of power. This is the understanding of Robert Dahl, one of the first to discuss the nature of power. Hannah Arendt rejected this idea of power as a zero-sum phenomenon, and in contrast, associated power with con-
sensus, legitimacy and pursuit of collective goals, that is, power to or power as ability.

Others (Steven Lukes) have contributed to the debate by arguing that any definition must include aspects that exist outside the observable decision-making process, i.e. the exclusion of certain issues from the agenda, and social and cultural patterns of behaviour of groups and institutions, for example marginalized groups’ denial of inequalities by referring to their individual misfortune rather than social injustice (Indian caste system), something which prevents groups from imagining alternatives to the existing state of affairs, in sum, power as mobilisation of biased norms, rules and procedures.23

This could also be called hidden layers of power, or internalised power, layers that form people’s minds and desires, succinctly described as: ...is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognition, and preferences in such a way that they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial? (Lukes, 1974:24)

This aspect of power is crucial to gender relations as it intersects with how the processes of gender identities are constructed. It reflects the norms and values in a society, which nearly always give less value on women than men, girl children than boys. It further reflects what is “allowed” and “not allowed” in being a woman and man.

Several feminist researchers have in various ways applied and adopted the framework Lukes’ theory offers, some of which also have pointed out limitations in his analysis of the role of ideology, and called attention to how discourse analysis can help to expose underlying ‘systematic, common, everyday assumptions’, which perpetuate and reinforce status quo, for example in institutions and organisations. Fletcher developed three methodological steps to reveal ‘the deep structures’ or hidden layers of power that ‘drive behaviour and make meaning’ in organisations: First, one has to listen to women in order to understand their experience. By listening and including these voices in the political agenda, assumptions which will challenge the mainstream will be uncovered. Second, one has to understand why these experiences have been silenced. Third, one needs to identify outsiders, insiders, and ‘change agents’, in organisations or institutions and ask them to articulate and raise the consequences of the assumptions that were made visible and revealed in the first step. This process is intended to bring out alternative discourses, which could challenge and transform the status quo from a gender perspective.

The perception of what power is has changed over time, its meaning having broadened out to include other aspects than the narrow definition of Dahl. Michel Foucault contributed to this development by skipping the question of “what is power” and moving into determining how and by what means power is exercised (knowledge is a key factor), while viewing power as something circulating in a network-like organisation rather than as being possessed by individuals. In Foucault’s view, power is not only negative, repressive, in what it seeks to control, but also productive, in the sense that it constructs things, knowledge and induces pleasure. Pierre Bourdieu, in turn, argued that individuals inhabiting certain characteristics are assigned more status – through symbolic, cultural or economic capital – and thus more decision-making power than others.24
Finally, power could also be defined as a relational phenomenon as it is shaped in the daily interaction between human beings – through mechanisms of hierarchisation and stereotyping (Mona Lilja). Power in the understanding of hierarchies may include steering of thoughts and actions by way of grading and ranking statements, identities and individuals. Stereotypes, in turn, may establish normality, exclude other types of and ways of thinking and lead to different kinds of discrimination. Stereotyped pictures of “the Other” may end up in physical violence and even ethnic cleansing.

For our purposes a distinction between controlling power and constructive power may be appropriate and good enough, provided that hidden layers of power (see above) are also included. Controlling power is something completely different from constructive power.²⁵ The distinction might equally be phrased in terms of a difference between ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. Assuming that Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Kenya are like most developing countries, their governments suffer as much from the lack of constructive power – the capacity to organise, to actually command their civil and military bureaucracies, to direct public money where they wish, to obtain the trust and willing compliance of citizens – as their citizens suffer from the concentration of controlling power, and the women from hidden layers of power.

The issue of the need to construct power was more or less ignored in first generation power assessments. And this is directly relevant to the de facto focus of these studies on possible progress toward democracy. For most developing countries, progress toward democracy tends to require both (a) some reduction in the controlling power of the central state executive and (b) increases in the constructive power of various parts of the state apparatus.

The failure to systematically link discussions of power to poverty left out issues such as the prevailing political culture and political will of key actors to redress the plight of the poor. It is suggested that future work should stress that power entails that poor groups have a voice, that central institutions and actors are responsive to the concerns of the poor, and that mechanisms are in place to hold these institutions and actors to account. It is also important to acknowledge that political authorities, civil society and the international community should be held accountable to the overriding goal of poverty reduction.²⁶

Role of Development Cooperation – Donors, by empowering one set of institutions and actors over others, may shape the power dynamics in poor, aid recipient societies. None of the first generation Sida ToRs or studies considered the challenging question of how power, and the relative distribution of power in aid recipient societies, may be affected by international aid transfers.
Annex 3
– OECD/DAC Task Team on Power and Drivers of Change

The objectives set up for the task team of Govnet were the following:
– to share existing case studies amongst donors and mapping the ongo-
ing activities of relevant members
– to acquaint members with the variety of approaches to political
analysis being developed and applied
– Synthesis and Analysis of Donor Experience
– development of a guidance note to be endorsed by Govnet in 2006

Sida, Norad, DFID and the Govnet Secretariat commissioned a study in
2005 with a focus on the need to identify commonalities and differences
in methods, choice of countries and so on. The study also considered the
broader implications of this work for the nature and design of assistance
programmes – i.e. the value added.

The study, which was coordinated by COWI International, suggested
i.a., the creation of a web-based clearing house for political economy
studies through Govnet, where all Power and DOC studies published by
the individual donors could be made available country-by-country; im-
proved linkages between Govnet and in-country donor coordination
groups, especially those responsible for democratic governance issues; en-
couraged in-country donor coordination groups to establish a more con-
sistent set of documentation on political economy analysis; production of
guidance notes for conducting Power and DOC analysis for donors com-
ing fresh to this work; identification of means by which study findings
can be synthesised to feed more effectively into Joint Assistance Strate-
gies and the design of PRSPs in partner countries; and improved cross-
referencing to and integration with other types of donor analysis on hu-
nan rights, conflict, and institutional capacity.

The task team’s second assignment, production and Govnet approval
of a Guidance note on Power and Drivers of Change Analysis was com-
pleted in 2006. The task team’s mandate was part of the Govnet’s Work
Programme in 2005–2006. After graduation, the task team may evolve
into an informal and self-sustained network which may dock into the
wider donor community (through Govnet) on a regular basis.
Annex 4 – References

**Power analysis –**
- The Culture of Power in Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life, 2003 (Sida Studies no 10)
- Kenya, 2003 (final draft)
- A Study on Political, Economic and Social Power Relations and Structures in Burkina Faso, 2004 (Mimeograph)
- Mali, 2004 (draft only)
- Bangladesh – A power Analysis of the Local Power Structure of Bangladesh – With An Emphasis on Faridpur and Rajbari Districts
- Tanzania (May 2004 and February 2005) and a document entitled Monitoring Power for Development Policy Analysis (May 2005)
- Mozambique, to be completed in 2006
- Uganda, to be completed in 2006
- Sri Lanka, to be completed in 2006

**Websites:**
For info on DFID’s Drivers of Change:
http://www.grc-exchange.org/g_themes/politicalsystems_drivers.html
For info on Govnet’s work:
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_34565_36864199_1_1_1_1,00.html
For info on the World Bank’s work:
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/politicaleconomy

**Studies and Articles –**
Booth, David, the Africa Commission Report: What about the Politics? Overseas Development Institute, 2005
Söderberg, Mimmi, and Ohlsson, Thomas “Democratisation and Armed Conflicts”, Department for Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, for Sida, March 2003
Mimeographs –
Children and Adults with Disabilities, Position Paper, Department for Democracy and Social Development, December 2005
Country Level Analysis for Poverty Reduction, Methods Document, Sida Department for Policy and Methodology, November 2005
Democracy, Power and Partnership, Conference Report, Collegium for Development Studies, Uppsala University, 2002
Digging Deeper – Four Reports on Democratic Governance – a Summary, Sida, 2003
Informal and Formal Institutions, Skog-Eriksson, Gun, Mimeograph, Sida Evaluation 2005/05
OECD/DAC/Govnet: ”Lessons Learned on the Use of Power and Drivers of Change Analysis in Development Cooperation“ (2005) and a Guidance Note – “Power and Drivers of Change Analysis – Lessons Learned and Further Challenges” (2006) available at: http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,2340,en_2649_34565_36864199_1_1_1_1,00.html
Political Institutions: Parties, Elections and Parliaments, Mimeograph, Sida 2004
Power and Privileges: Gender Discrimination and Poverty, Interim Studies, Regeringskansliet, 2004
Promoting Gender Equality in Development Cooperation, Sida Policy, 2005
Signposts to More Effective States, IDS, Sussex University, 2005
Promoting Peace and Security through Development Cooperation, Sida Policy, 2005

Literature –
Suggested Additional Literature on Gender:


Taylor Viviene (2000) *Marketisation of Governance: Critical Feminist Perspectives from the South*, Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), University of Cape Town, South Africa


Suggested reading on the relationship between HIV/AIDS and power:

1. *International Affairs* 82, 2 (2006) Nine-article special issue focused on *Power Relations and HIV/AIDS* to mark the 25th anniversary of the identification of HIV containing articles focused on different kinds of power relations that is “…driving HIV/AIDS, frustrating the possibilities of alleviation, care and recovery, and operating to relegate entire regions to a vulnerable and bleak future.” (Poku & Whiteside, “Introduction: 25 years of living with HIV/AIDS: challenges and prospects”, *International Affairs* 82, 2 2006:249).


(Endnotes)

1 Voices of the Poor – Crying Out for Change, 2000.
2 Donor agencies tend to have immense analytical resources compared to local academia, independent think tanks and government bodies devoted to analytical work. A single framework developed by donors only, or by donors in collaboration with a particular Ministry would thus risk undermining local capacity and space for knowledge production and agenda setting (cf. The New Conditionality – The Politics of Poverty Reduction Strategies, 2005)
3 It should be noted that these instruments to a varying degree are inspired by macro and micro social analysis, political economy and political anthropology and different schools of sociology. They share common objects of analysis, although in practice they differ in substance (respectively: power relations and how they circumscribe opportunities/tensions, conflict of interests and the arenas where they are played out/roles of social structures in determining access to resources) and in the ends to which they are put.
4 Some Sida power studies have focused on different issues. The Ethiopia study, for example, also linked political dimensions of power to economic dimensions as well as conflict risks and their respective implications for political, social and economic development in the country.
5 World Bank instruments include country social analysis, country policy and institutional analysis, institutional and governance reviews or political economy analysis and scoping notes.
6 DFID’s studies may be found at http://www.grc-exchange.org/g_themes/politicalsystems_drivers.html, information of the World Bank’s work at: http://www1.worldbank.org/pubssector/politiceconomy/PublicSectorGovernanceunit, and International IDEA’s at http://www.idea.int/democracy/index.cfm
7 Govnet is one of several networks on donor harmonisation hosted by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
8 A synthesis report on “Lessons Learned on the Use of Power and Drivers of Change Analysis in Development Cooperation” (2005) and a Guidance Note (2006) are available at www.oecd.dac.org/http://www.oecd.org/document/70/0,2340,en_2649_34565_36864199_1_1_1_1,00.html as well as minutes of a 2004 OECD/DAC workshop on Drivers of Change/Political Economy Analysis
9 first round by Sida only, second round was a joint donor exercise
10 first round by Sida only, second round was a joint donor exercise based on the previous Sida report and DFID’s DOC report
12 Shared Responsibility; Sweden’s policy for Global Development 2002/03:122, and Perspectives on Poverty, Sida 2002
13 In one case the analysis prevented donors’ field representations from changing their joint approach too quickly without thinking through the consequences, in spite of mounting pressure for immediate action in capitals.
14 Draft only
15 Limited studies on children, the informal economy, and indigenous peoples have been drafted as an outcome of Sida’s focus group sessions
17 When applicable Sida staff should assess the extent to which gender relations, or the dominating patriarchal order, negatively affect the situation of poor women and girls, including increasing their susceptibility to HIV infection and vulnerability to the impact of AIDS morbidity and mortality on their livelihoods.
18 Political parties funded by the private sector may be particularly vulnerable to undermined legitimacy and accountability to members and voters
19 First generation terms of references tended to be very ambitious; the consultants had a great deal to cover in relation to their time input. This should be compared with the Norwegian and Swedish public power analysis which involved a lot of researchers who could devote several years to produce one white paper and several reports.
20 Recent analysis carried out in Vietnam, Honduras, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania suggests that the PRSP processes to a large extent influence power dynamics. In Malawi and Zambia researchers found that a new accountability relationship between non-governmental organisations, Government (Ministry of Finance primarily) and the international donor community have been formed. However, the formal political institutions of participation and accountability, such as parliaments and political parties, have been sidelined in these processes (Gould, 2005)
21 As a comparison it could be mentioned that a conflict analysis may consist of analysis of long term (historical) factors underlying power distribution (structures); actors, based on mapping of relevant actors: interests, relations, agendas, capacities; and dynamics of long term trends of (future) power distribution.
22 “Democratisation and Armed Conflicts”, Sida March 2003, by Mimmi Söderberg and Thomas Ohlsson
23 This section draws on Lilja (2000)
24 Ibid.
25 Moore, in Sida workshop, 2004
26 Rakner, ibid.
27 Available at www.sida.se/publications
28 Ibid
Halving poverty by 2015 is one of the greatest challenges of our time, requiring cooperation and sustainability. The partner countries are responsible for their own development. Sida provides resources and develops knowledge and expertise, making the world a richer place.